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TAGS: [ECON](#) [EFIN](#) [ETRD](#) [ETTC](#) [KNNP](#) [PREL](#) [SN](#)
SUBJECT: (S) GOS AWARE OF DESIGNATION OF LOCAL FIRMS,
REQUESTS MORE EVIDENCE OF TRANSACTIONS

REF: A. STATE 104496
[1](#)B. STATE 109141
[1](#)C. STATE 59289
[1](#)D. STATE 90838
[1](#)E. SINGAPORE 1021

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Herbold reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

[1](#)1. (S) SUMMARY: Econoff delivered to MFA counterproliferation officials October 16 demarches regarding: the designation of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Singapore firm Asia Marine Network PTE Ltd. (Ref A); and changes to the Department of Commerce Entity List, including the addition of three Singapore-based firms believed to be connected to Mayrow General Trading (Ref B). Sharon Seah, MFA Assistant Director for Counter Proliferation and International Security, responded that Singapore has not yet taken specific enforcement action against Asia Marine Network. She requested specific and actionable intelligence regarding actual transactions with IRISL. Seah said MFA would inform appropriate agencies of the additions to the Entity List and that enforcement agencies would monitor the companies' activities. During the same meeting, Seah provided a non-paper update on ongoing cases involving Ace Pressureweld (Ref C) and Satair PTE Ltd. (Ref D). Seah said GOS authorities had met with both Ace Pressureweld and Satair to ensure the firms understood their export control obligations but had found no evidence that either company exported the items as described in Ref C and [1](#)D. End Summary.

Designation of IRISL and Asia Marine Network

[1](#)2. (S) Econoff delivered Ref A demarche to Sharon Seah, MFA Assistant Director for Counterproliferation and International Security on October 16, after providing MFA the public information regarding the designation of IRISL and related entities by email on October 7. Seah said that prior to the designation, the GOS had not monitored Asia Marine Network PTE Ltd., the Singapore-based firm designated as among those entities acting, or purporting to act, on behalf of IRISL. GOS authorities are now conducting due diligence on the company, she told us. The GOS has not frozen the assets of Asia Marine Network, or approached national companies about ceasing operations with IRISL or related entities, and Seah was unaware of any inspections of IRISL-related cargo.

[1](#)3. (S) Seah said GOS authorities are quietly watching Asia Marine Network so they do not alert it to GOS monitoring, which might cause the company to change its business practices or tactics. Seah said there is no standard procedure for dealing with local firms publicly designated for possible involvement in proliferation-related activities. The GOS prefers to handle them on a case-by-case basis.

Seah emphasized the need for more actionable intelligence on such companies, noting that having information regarding actual transactions between Asia Marine Network and IRISL would speed up the GOS investigation.

Addition of Mayrow and Others to Commerce Entity List

14. (S) MFA will inform appropriate GOS agencies regarding the changes to the Department of Commerce Entity List and the addition of three Singapore-based firms, Seah said. The companies are "on our radar," she said, reiterating the need for more evidence of actual transactions among the three firms and Mayrow General Trading. The GOS does not intend to make any immediate changes to its legislation restricting the sale or export of dual-use items. However, the MFA indicated in a previous meeting (Ref E) that the GOS plans to embark on a year-long review of Singapore's export control regime and that review could lead to additional changes and enhancements to Singapore laws.

Ace Pressureweld

15. (S) GOS enforcement agencies met with Ace Pressureweld twice in 2007, and to date have found no evidence of exports related to the items in Ref C, Seah explained. She provided a brief non-paper describing GOS findings on the Ace Pressureweld and Satair cases (see full text below). Seah would not say which agencies met with Ace Pressureweld, but said the GOS advised the company's management to exercise due diligence and avoid involvement in illicit transactions such as the supply of goods to WMD-related entities in Pakistan or

other countries of proliferation concern. GOS authorities remain vigilant and will continue to monitor Ace Pressureweld, Seah said.

Satair PTE Ltd.

16. (S) According to Seah and the non-paper she provided (see full text below) Singapore authorities also met with Satair PTE Ltd., a company headquartered in Denmark that imports and re-exports aircraft components for commercial aircraft. There has been no export to Malaysia of the items described in Ref D. Seah indicated that the GOS will continue to monitor the company, which according to the non-paper, is aware of its obligations under Singapore's export control regime.

Text of Non-Paper from MFA on Ace Pressureweld and Satair

17. (S) Below is the text of the non-paper we received from the MFA regarding Ace Pressureweld and Satair PTE Ltd.

(S) Begin Non-Paper text:

We thank the US for the information shared with Singapore through the US Embassy, between June and September 2008, on the activities of two Singapore-based companies. The findings of the Singapore authorities are given below.

Ace Pressureweld

2 In 2007, enforcement agencies met Ace Pressureweld twice. To date, there has been no evidence of any exports relating specifically to the items highlighted in the non-paper provided. During the meetings, Ace Pressureweld's management was advised to exercise due diligence and not to be involved in any illicit transactions particularly in the supply of goods to WMD-related entities in Pakistan or other proliferating countries.

3 The relevant authorities will continue to remain vigilant and monitor the activities of Ace Pressureweld and ascertain if they had been involved in any such exports via a

front or associated company.

Satair Pte Ltd

4 Satair Pte Ltd is a trading company headquartered in Denmark which deals in aircraft parts and accessories. The company imports and re-exports aircraft components to be used in commercial aircrafts. There has been no export of the items described in the US non-paper, to Malaysia. Satair had also not made any direct exports to Iran. Authorities met with the company who is aware of the strategic goods control regime in Singapore. Authorities will continue to monitor and meet up with the company again, to reiterate to them to exercise due diligence and any possible diversion of controlled goods from Malaysia to Iran. Authorities will continue to monitor the company for possible violation under the Strategic Goods (Control) Act and highlight to them about the US re-export controls.

Conclusion

5 Industry has been alerted to the respective UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran and the attendant sanctions lists of individuals and entities believed to be engaged in WMD-related activities. We welcome timely information and actionable intelligence and evidence that the US may have on these companies regarding their alleged links with Iran and Pakistan.

End text of Non-Paper.

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